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Abstract. This paper demonstrates that the Bertrand paradox does not hold if cost
functions are strictly convex. Instead, multiple equilibria exist which can
be Pareto-ranked. The paper shows that the Pareto-dominant
equilibrium may imply profus higher than in Cournot competition or may
even sustain perfect cartelization. The potential scope for implicit
collusion is discussed for the case that the Pareto-dominant non-
cooperative equilibrium does not support perfect cartelization. Due to
multiple non-cooperative equilibria, the discussion involves finitely
repeated Bertrand games as well. The paper discusses several strategies
which may support implicit collusion. 1t develops the notion of
punishment-proofness, and it demonstrates that strongly renegotiation-
proof equilibria exist for sujficiently high discount factors. Finally,
extensions are discussed which cover Stackeiberg leadership, fixed and
sunk costs and endogenous market structures.
I am indebted to Gernot Klepper and Peter Michaelis for very useful discussion.
The usual disclaimer applies.Profits in pure Bertrand oligopolies
Since its early beginnings, identifying the relevant strategy set of oligopolists has been
a main focus of oligopoly theory. Two positions were taken which are associated with
Cournot (1838) and Bertrand (1883): Cournot-based oligopoly modeis assume that
oligopolists determine quantities the sum of which determines prices. Bertrand-based
oligopoly modeis assume that oligopolists set prices which determine their individual
demand. The debate about the appropriate assumption would not have received such
much academic attention if the implications were not such different, especially for
homogeneous goods. But Bertrand's model demonstrated that prices drop down on
marginal costs if oligopolists compete by prices instead of quantities. This result
entered economic theory as the famous Bertrand paradox which asserts that two are
enough for perfect competition.
The Bertrand paradox troubled many economists because they could hardly imagine
that increasing the number of firms from a monopolistic market structure to an
oligopolistic market structure leaves no scope for prices above marginal costs. Several
escape routes were taken in order to reconcile economic intuition about market power
and price competition. A first escape route taken very early by Edgeworth (1897)
demonstrated that the Bertrand paradox does not hold if firms face a binding capacity
constraint. Based on Edgeworth, a lot of papers dealt with so-called Bertrand-
Edgeworth modeis in which firms compete by prices and ration demand if capacity
constraints are reached. If a certain firm has to ration demand, the residual demand can
be served by other firms. In another approach, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) made the
choice of the capacity constraint endogenous such that firms choose their capacity
constraints in a first stage, and set prices in a second stage. They demonstrated that
this two-stage game of capacities and prices gives the same outcome as the
corresponding one-stage game of quantity determination a la Cournot. Other
contributions have introduced the notion of supply function equilibria (Grossman,1981, Hart, 1985). This concept combines price and quantity competition such that the
firms strategy set refers to the determination of functions which specify different
prices for different individual supply levels.
A second escape route relaxed the assumption of homogeneous goods. Price
competition in pure Bertrand oligopolies assumes perfect substitutability of one firm's
product through another firm's product. Consequently, a marginal price reduction
compared to competitors, gives one firm the whole demand. Hotelling (1929)
introduced a modification of perfect substitutability by the assumption of positive
transport costs and different locations of firms. Other papers generalized this approach
and assumed that consumers like or dislike several attributes of goods such that all
goods are not perfectly substitutable. Although equilibria for these differentiated
goods' markets do not necessarily exist, dropping down the assumption of perfect
substitutability guarantees that price reduction does not capture the whole industry's
demand. Thereby, marginal price changes imply marginal revenue effects and render
price competition in differentiated goods' markets similar to Cournot competition in
that point.
A third escape route pronounces the long-run aspects of price competition. The Folk
theorem demonstrated that any outcome between the purely non-cooperative one and
the cooperative one is sustainable as a subgame-perfect equilibrium in a supergame if
the discount factor lies in a sufficiently close neighborhood of unity (Fudenberg,
Maskin, 1986). Compared to quantity competition, price competition is supposed to
imply weaker constraints with respect to the discount factor in order to sustain implicit
collusion (Deneckere, 1983). For the case of constant unit costs for duopolists, it can
be shown easily that every discount factor which does not fall short from 0.5 Supports
any alternative outcome which improves on zero profits including the monopolistic
one if defection is punished by the trigger strategy.
So far, an uncountable number of papers have modified the original Bertrand game in
order to reinforce the relevance of market power. However, it is sometimes advisable3
to go "back to the roots" and try to reconsider the arguments from the distance. The
first part of this paper will go backwards in this sense and reconsider Bertrand
competition in its simplest variant. The simplest variant is to suppose that the strategy
of firms is to set prices for a homogeneous good which determine their individual
demand. However, a slight modification with respect to the cost functions will be
assumed: instead of constant unit costs, strict convexity of the cost function will be
assumed. It will be shown in section 2 that the Bertrand paradox relies crucially on
constant unit costs whereas strictly convex cost functions produce multiple equilibria
which all guarantee positive profus and which can be Pareto-ranked. This section will
also demonstrate that the Pareto-dominant equilibrium may imply profits which
surmount those of the corresponding Cournot equilibrium. Even more, Bertrand
competition will be shown to be able to sustain the perfectly collusive outcome in a
purely non-cooperative environment of a one-shot game.
This result is grounded on the original model of Bertrand competition in combination
with strict convexity of the cost function. The model assumes m oligopolists each of
which sets an individual price and faces a resulting demand. This assumption is the
appropriate one to compare price-based with quantity-based competition. In Cournot
modeis, oligopolists set quantities and face a resulting demand as well. When
comparing both modeis, an enriched Bertrand model should not be compared with the
simplest Cournot model. From this point of view, capacity constraints are a very
restrictive assumption because they assume that a firm is technologically not able to
increase its production beyond a certain level. Capacity constraints imply individual
cost functions which do not cover the whole ränge of possible individual demands
because they restrict the domain of the cost function. If infinite marginal costs are
ruled out, convex cost functions allow every firm to meet its individual demand for
some finite costs. Compared to the case of constant unit cost, convex cost functions
are a more appropriate assumption for assessing costs on the firm level. As cost
functions are the dual of production functions, the existence of a relevant production
factor the provision of which is not determined by the firm but fixed (e.g. publicinfrastructure) is likely to induce increasing marginal costs for a Single firm. Constant
unit costs draw heayily on both the assumption of constant economies of scale and the
assumption of possible Variation of all relevant production factors on the firm level.
In this sense, rationing is an extremely stränge assumption, too, because it implicitly
enlarges the policy options of oligopolists who are not obliged to serve their individual
demands. They may evade by using another allocation scheme than that of pure price
setting. Therefore, rationing in Bertrand-Edgeworth modeis should be contrasted with
Cournot modeis which allow some revision of the determined quantities as well.
Additionally, rationing is obviously no appropriate assumption for a lot of markets on
which producers have to announce prices which are laid down in contracts with
whplesalers or retailers such that any demand should be served by these prices. It is
this case which defines the original Bertrand game.
Based on the results of section II, the paper continues by considering long-term effects
of pure Bertrand competition. It assumes that the Pareto-dominant one-shot
equilibrium obtains profits which fall short from those of perfect collusion in order to
face a relevant intertemporal coordination problem for oligopolists. As the paper is not
restricted on duopolies but Covers the case of more than two oligopolists as well,
special attention is given to the potential role subcoalitions of the grand coalition can
play. Section III demonstrates that the relevant defection is the defection of a Single
firm, and that the critical discount factor increases with the degree of implicit
collusion. Section IV adopts the concept of weak renegotiation-proofness (van
Damme, 1989, Farrell, Maskin, 1989) which allows to return to cooperation after a
party has deviated from implicit collusion. It is shown that the corresponding
constraints dominate the problem and that a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium
which improves on the non-cooperative outcome may not exist. Section V discusses
both the credibility for a defecting firm to be punished and the credibility of non-
defecting firm to punish. The first aspect will be referred to as punishment-proofness,
and, the last aspect has been referred to as strong renegotiation-proofness in theliterature (Farrell, Maskin, 1989). The section shows that a weakly renegotiation-proof
equilibrium may exist which is punishment-proof as well. But punishment-proofness
may demand modification of the non-defecting parties' strategies which weak
renegotiation-proofness assumed by reverting to non-cooperative pricing. It is also
shown that this equilibrium is strongly renegotiation-proof for sufficiently high
discount factors. Section VI overviews possible extensions of the model, and section
VII concludes the paper.
I. The model
The model assumes a demand function which specifies total demand as a function of
the lowest price. Total demand decreases with the lowest price, and the demand
function is concave:
(1) D = X[p], Xp<0, Xpp<0 p = min{Pl,...,pJ.
{p, ,...,pm } is the set of prices which the m firms specify. The individual demand of a






(2) assumes that all k
, firms which announce the lowest price share the corresponding
demand equally, whereas every firm announcing a higher price faces no demand. An
equal split may be not guaranteed as a certain event but may be expected by every
lowest-price-charging firm. In this case, individual demand is stochastic and does not
depend on demand realized in previous periods, and firms are supposed to be risk-
neutral.As the demand curve is differentiable for every price, even extremely small price
reductions are able to capture the whole demand. The model will assume that small
price reductions which make a set consisting of k oligopolists (which can be a
singleton) capture the whole demand can be approximated by the original price:
fp/ pip 8
(3) x.=^ /k if ' * fore<0,e«0.
[ 0 Pi=P
(3) shows that reduction by a small £ assumes to capture the whole demand at the
original price p.
The profits of every firm are the difference between sales and costs. Costs are assumed
to be strictly convex, and marginal costs for zero production do not exceed the
reservation price:
(4) n^p.Xi-cfo), cx>o, c^ >o,
Cx(0)<X"
1[X = 0], CX[X(O)]<°°, C(0) = 0.
X"
1 denotes the inverse demand function derived from (1). All firms use the same
technology so that there is no difference in costs which is a quite reasonable
assumption for homogeneous goods. (4) guarantees that demand is strictly positive and
that capacity constraints play no role because marginal costs are finite for one firm
which serves the maximum market demand. (4) assumes no fixed or sunk costs and
ensures that all m firms do not incur losses in the market. Section VI will relax this
assumption and will discuss endogenous market structures as well. In section II, the
model will also employ specific demand and profit functions to pronounce the
relevance of profits in Bertrand oligopolies:
(5) D(p) = £-£, C(xi) = axi+&xf, a>a ob /
(5) defines a linear inverse demand function of the form p = a - bX and a quadratic
cost function.The model assumes further that firms always prefer to produce if their profus are non-
negative, and that they choose the cooperative Solution if defection gives them the
same profits. Additionally, the paper assumes almost perfect knowledge such that all
functions are common knowledge for price policies but all firms have to announce
prices simultaneously. The analysis is restricted on pure price policy strategies of all
firms.
Another conceptual remark concerns the use of differentials in this paper. The paper
will discuss the implications of changes in m, i.e. the number of oligopolists, and will
specify the number of punishment periods, n^, for renegotiation-proof equilibria.
Obviously, both the parameter m and the variable n^ are restricted on the set of natural
numbers. Changes of these terms, however, can be evaluated by derivatives of




(6) demonstrates that an unambiguous sign of the derivative does also signal the same
sign for the change of the original function. (6) will often be made use of, and for the
sake of simplicity, the derivatives will use the same functional assignment.
II. The Bertrand paradox reconsidered
The assumption that all firms prefer production if non-negative profits are guaranteed
implies that all firms Charge the same price which must not fall short from the
corresponding marginal costs implied by the resulting individual demand. If costfunctions are (strictly) convex, prices which do not fall short from marginal costs
imply (strictly) positive profits. Identical pricing and marginal costs define the first






B denotes the equilibrium price of Bertrand competition. (7), however, is not
sufficient for an equilibrium. The second condition wants every firm not to improve on
its profits by setting a lower price. This condition can be set up by the use of the profit
change function (8) which is defined for non-positive e only:
(8) e<0:
AT H , J B*(P
B) JX(P
B)
Ai[p,e,k] = (-e) ^-p




Aj is a function of the price p which is the lowest price charged by k oligopolists
(k < m) if e = 0, the price reduction e of a Single firm, and the number of firms
charging the Bertrand price. If e is zero, the individual firm does not reduce its price
and profits are not changed. If e is negative, however, this unilateral price reduction
implies a profit change which is given in the brackets (note that 8 is negative): the firm
loses the individual demand shared with the other firms (first term), avoids the
corresporiding costs (second term), gains the whole demand due to price reduction
(third term), and has to carry the corresponding costs (fourth term). The first two terms
do not depend on 8. Multiplying the bracket term which indicates the profit change by
(-e) is a monotone transformation of the profit change. If Ai is a monotone
transformation of the profit change implied by a price reduction, the extremals are not
varied by this transformation.The second condition for a Bertrand price equilibrium wants every firm not to reduce
its individual price unilaterally in order to improve on its profits, Hence, the first







(9) takes into account that all firms Charge the same price. Thus, (9) must hold for
every firm in the market. Condition (9) has a straightforward Interpretation: A price
equilibrium must make every firm refrain from announcing a marginally lower price.
(9) indicates that this condition is fulfilled if the increase in profits due to serving the
whole demand does not exceed the decrease of profits when sharing the demand
equally with all other oligopolists.
A third condition not to be overlooked sets a lower limit to prices. If all firms
colluded, they maximized the total profits subject to the sum of production costs. The
resulting price of perfect monopolization is given by








Perfect monopolization will be denoted by the superscript M. Note that perfect
monopolization does not mean that only one firm is in the market but that all firms
realize a price which maximizes the sum of profits. Therefore, (10) gives the Solution
for a monopolists who employs m plants. Obviously, the Bertrand price equilibrium
will never specify a price which exceeds the price of perfect collusion according to
(10).













(11) demonstrates that the equilibrium price must not exceed a term which itself
exceeds average costs. This result may be not surprising at first glance because convex
cost functions imply marginal costs above average costs and thereby induce profits by
the mere curvature of the cost function. Thereby, the existence of at least one
equilibrium is proved because equalizing prices and marginal costs fulfils (11).
However, the set of equilibria described by (11) is not a singleton, and equilibria exist
which are based on prices strictly above marginal costs. This assertion is stated in
Proposition 1:
Proposition 1: If cost functions are strictly convex, multiple equilibria exist which
can be Pareto-ranked.
Proof:
The proof for the first part of Proposition 1 can be easily given by contradiction.
Suppose that (11) entails a unique equilibrium the price of which falls short from the
price of perfect collusion and define
P':=- m
m
p' gives the limit price indicated by the second line of (11), p" gives the marginal cost
price. If p' < pM? the set of equilibria were a singleton if both prices feil together:11
(12) p' = p"=> C[X(p')] = X(p')
m
m-lp [X(p')
m L m• _
X(p')
(11), however, contradicts strict convexity by definition of convex functions. Thus, p'
and p" fall apart and multiple equilibria exist which lie between both prices.
Additionally, it is obvious that p^ and p" fall apart. Q.e.d. (12) held only for linear
cost functions which equalize marginal and average costs.
The second part of Proposition 1 can be proved by differentiating the profits of every







(13) shows that profits increase with prices and all equilibria can be Pareto-ranked.
The Pareto-dominant equilibrium is specified by setring p equal to min{p',pM}. Q.e.d.
This result contrasts the Bertrand paradox substantially which assumed that prices
always drop down on marginal costs. Proposition 1 demonstrates that this assertion
depends crucially on constant unit costs. For example, a firm out of three firms
announcing a certain price below the price of its competitors has to take into account
that tripling the demand implies more than tripling individual costs to serve the
demand. Thus, price equilibria above marginal cost exist which make a firm refrain
from capturing the whole demand because the increase in costs overcompensates the
increase in demand. For the Bertrand equilibrium, marginal costs define only the lower
limit of prices but the upper limit according to (11) is determined by comparing the
increase in total costs with the increase in demand. Therefore, marginal costs do not
play any role for the upper limit, and the Bertrand paradox relies crucially on constant
unit costs which by definition equalize marginal and average costs. As (12) holds for
constant unit costs which equalize average costs and the (unique) equilibrium price,
the proof of Proposition 2 is straightforward.12
Proposition 2: Without fixed costs, strictly convex cost functions imply profus and
strictly linear cost functions imply zero profits in a one-shot Bertrand
game.
Proof:
See (12) and Proposition 1.
In the cäse of convex cost functions, there are several equilibria which cover the price
ränge [min{p',pM},p"}. Multiple equilibria involve an equilibrium selection problem.
It isby no means clear which price will result from the Bertrand game unless more
structure in form of an equilibrium selection mechanism is intruded into the model. If
one firm sets its individual price equal to marginal costs, other firms can do no better
than charging the same price although this equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by all
other attainable equilibria. There is a long tradition in economic theory to assume that
agents choose the Pareto-dominant equilibria when all equilibria can be Pareto-ranked.
As it is not the aim of this paper to add to the debate on equilibrium selection, it will
not break with this tradition and assume that min{p',pM} is selected in the one-shot
game. This assumption will be made throughout the rest of this section (and all terms
referring to this equilibrium will be denoted either by a prime or the superscript M).
Note that this assumption is indeed an optimistic one for this section. However, it were
a more restrictive one for the following chapters because it may make defection from
implicit collusion obviously more attractive.
As it is a novel conclusion that profits by setting prices above marginal costs are
possible in Bertrand oHgopolies, it is interesting to explore the behavior of Pareto-
dominant profits with the number of oligopolists. Increasing the number of firms has a
twofold impact: on the one hand, demand must be divided among more firms, on the
other hand, all firms operate at a lower average cost level. Proposition 3 shows that the
influence of the number of firms in the market is qualitatively the same as in Cournot
competition:4es Instituts f•" r Wp!t\*/iitsch<
Proposition 3: Individuell profus decrease with the number ofoligopolists.
Proof:
The first part of the proof deals with the case that p' < p^ holds. The Pareto-dominant










the partial derivative of which with respect to prices is positive, i.e.
3p'
because (13) holds for all Bertrand equilibrium prices including the best one. Partial






(15) shows that increasing the number of firms for a constant price decreases profits.
(16) defines the condition for determining the Pareto-dominant price as an implicit
funetion:
(16) <D[p',m]:= \l - ~V X(p') - C[X(p')] + C
m
= 0.
Partial differentiation with respect to p' and m indicates the sign of the price change
















dm 3m 3p' dm
dp'/dm is unambiguously negative and thereby proves the negative sign of the total
derivative of profits with respect to m. For the second part of the proof, it is well-
known that
3p' 3m
must holds for petfect coUusion. The derivative with respect to price must be negative
because any unilateral increase (decrease) away from the price of perfect coUusion
must decrease (increase) individual profits. The derivative with respect to m must be
negative because (15) holds in general. Defining the perfect collusion's price
































Proposition 4 detnonstrates that the effect on the total industry's profits is ambiguous
except for the case of pM.
Proposition 4: The profits ofthe industry increase with number offirms ifthe price of
perfect collusion is an equilibrium. For all other Pareto-dominant
prices, the impact is ambiguous.
Proof:




|I = X(p)-Xp(p) dp p-cx
X(p)
m
= 0 for p = p
}













dn an an dp . r M . . r M = + S- = 0 for p = p , undetermined for p < p .
dm dm ap dm
Q.e.d.
The section has always taken into account the restricting relevance of p
M compared to
p'. Comparing the determination of p' and p
M, it cannot be ruled out that pM is lower
than p' because p' was determined not as profit-maximizing but as equalizing the16
profits in the grand coalition and the profits of marginally reducing its individual price
below p'. As one expects Cournot competition to imply prices above marginal costs as
well, the relationship between Cournot competition and Bertrand competition is also
not quite clear on purely theoretical grounds. The general assumptions of the model










Xx' denotes the derivative of the inverse demand function with respect to Output. In
order to shed some more light on the relationship to both perfect collusion and
Cournot competition, the following two propositions adopt the specific functions
introduced by (3). The individual production levels for the Pareto-dominant, not by
pM restricted Output level, the Cournot Output level and output level of perfect














Proposition 5: The Pareto-dominant equilibrium may imply profits which surmount
profits ofthe corresponding Cournot equilibrium.
Proof:
Pareto-dominant profits exceed the Cournot profits if the individual output level
according to (22) falls strictly short from the one according (23). Such a ß exists:




ß measures the degree of convexity of the specific cost function. If ß exceeds ß(m),
the Pareto-dominant Bertrand equilibrium entails higher profits than the Cournot
equilibrium. The reason has to be found in convexity and in the individual demand
discontinuity: if cost functions are sufficiently convex, Bertrand prices can surmount
marginal costs sübstäntially because even a unilateral reduction from a high price
implied costs which overcomperisated the additional demand. In Cournot competition,
a marginal Variation of Output does only imply a marginal change of profits, but in
Bertrand competition the discontinuity in individual demand to be served and the
overproportional increase in costs makes firms refrain from charging lower prices. (25)
shows that the critical ß decfeases with the number of firms because the demand
increase is the higher the more firms are in the market. More firms in the market let
the individual market share for identical pricing shrink, and they let the jump from
individual demand to total demand to be served when charging a lower price increase.
Proposition 6 demonstrates that min{p',pM} = pM mav hold.
Proposition 6: The Pareto-dominant equilibrium may imply the maximum profits of
collusive profit maximization.
Proof:
Firms in Bertrand oligopoly will never increase prices beyond the price of perfect
cartelization. Thus, p' is dominated by p^ if the individual demand according to (22)




If ß does not fall short from ß(m), the Bertrand equilibrium entails perfect collusion
because any marginal price reduction increased costs more than sales. (26) shows that
the critical ß decreases with the number of firms because of the same reasons given for
the comparison with Cournot competition.
This section has demonstrated that Pareto-dominant Bertrand equilibria may entail
higher profits than in Cournot competition and even guarantee the collusive outcome.
Strict convexity of cost functions serves as a threat not to undermine prices because
the jump in sales may fall extremely short of the increase in costs. Compared to
Cöurnot competition, market power alone does not result in profits in Bertrand
competition. Instead, it is the combination with strictly increasing marginal costs
which feinforces the relevance of market power in Bertrand oligopolies.
III. Potential collusion in Bertrand oligopolies
The last section has demonstrated that multiple equilibria exist for the one-shot
Bertrand game if cost functions are strictly convex. Dynamic price competition is
well-known to be able to enlarge the set of equilibria. This section will deal with such
supergames which may allow to sustain profits above the purely non-cooperative one.
Apparently, repetition of the price game is only necessary to improve on the one-shot
outcome if min{p',pM} = p' < pM holds. This assumption will be made throughout the
next sections although pß = pM is not guaranteed if min{p',pM} = pM holds. But if
pM could be sustained in a one-shot game, it may be found to improve on profits by
intratemporal coordination rather than taking recourse to intertemporal strategy
specification.
This section will consider two subgame-perfect strategies which may sustain collusion
in finitely or infinitely repeated Bertrand games. As other non-cooperative equilibria
exist, it is well-known from Benoit and Krishna (1985) that other than one-shot
equilibria may be sustained in games with a finite number of repetitions. This section19
will start with finite repetition and turn to infinite repetition afterwards. The following
strategy may support other than non-cooperative equilibria in finitely repeated
Bertrand games.
Tngger strategy I: Charge the price p* in the first period. Charge the price p* also
in all following periods except the last one if all other firms have
charged the price p* as well. If one firm has defected by
charging a lower price, Charge the price p" in all future periods
including the last one. If no firm has defected, Charge the price p
,
in the last period.
For obvious reasons, the case of defection of all firms will be neglected throughout
this paper. All variables and functions which refer to outcomes sustained by repetition
will be denoted by a star. This strategy is called a trigger strategy as it does not allow
to return to cooperation after one firm has defected. This strategy sustains p* if (Cl)
holds:
(Cl) Vk<m, Vte{0,...,T}:
1 _ Äf-t) 1 _ X(T-t)
i—2__n;+5
(T-^n;>nf(k) + 5^-— n?
l-o 1 — o
T denotes the last period, and the superscript d denotes defection from collusion of a
subset of oligopolists which consists of k firms. The defection profits depend on the
number of "breaching" oligopolist. (Cl) demands that the discounted profits from
implicit collusion, i.e. setting price p* in all except the last periods, and setting p' in
the last period, must not fall short from defection in one period and the discounted
profits of reverting to p" for the rest of the time horizon.
(Cl) must hold for all x. Proposition 7 identifies the relevant period the constraint of
which according to (Cl) dominates all other periods.20
Proposition 7: If defection restricts the scope of implicit collusion in a finitely
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which gives (Cl) as a function of x for all periods except the last one in which 11* and
nf play no role. If 0 is positive, trigger strategy I supports the respective price p*.




) inS[n; - n; - s(n;'- n;)l
öl
the sign of which depends on II* -FI' -8(n['-n[), but is unambiguously either
negative or positive. Suppose that II* - Il[ — 8(n['- FI[) is non-positive, i.e.
(27) n;<n; + 5(n;'-n;)
which implied that the constraint becomes less biting the higher x is. Thus, the relevant
constraint were given by x = 0. A fortiori, the next-to-last period should be sustained,
i.e.
T -1) = (l - s)n; + (l - s)sn; - (1 - g)nf (k) - 8(1 - 8)n;'> 0
(28) <^> n; > n? (k) + s(n;'- n;)
should be satisfied. (28), however, contradicts (27) such that a non-negative derivative
is not possible. Consequently, the derivative must be negative and proves that 0
becomes more biting with x because 0 is decreased in the course of time. If 0 holds21
for T-l, it holds for all other previous periods. For the last period, p' > p" ensures
superiority of pursuing trigger strategy I. Q.e.d.
Proposition 7 proves that (Cl) is fulfilled for all x if
(ciy Vk<m: n; + srr; >nl
d(k)+5n;
/
is satisfied. In terms of the discount factor, trigger strategy I sustains the price p* if
holds. ö(p*) denotes the critical discount factor.
If the Bertrand game is infinitely repeated, trigger strategy II may sustain collusion.
Trigger strategy II: Charge the price p* in the first period. Charge the price p* also
in all following periods if all other firms have charged the price
p* as well. If one firm has defected by charging a lower price,
Charge the price p^ in all future periods.
Trigger strategy II does not specify p^ which may be any price belonging to the non-
cooperative equilibrium set, but it is obvious that the strengest support for collusion is






(C2) demands that the discounted profits of collusion in all periods must not fall short
from those of defection in one period and non-cooperation in all following periods.
Due to the infinite time horizon, no specification of the "binding" period is necessary.





hold&.,8(p*) denotes the critical discount factor.
However, it is still unknown for finitely as well as for infinitely repeated Bertrand
games which size k of the breaching coalition of firms is relevant. Proposition 8
clarifies this point.
Proposition 8: // defection restricts the scope of implicit collusion, the binding
constraint is deierminedby defection of a single firm.
Proof:
First, note that any coalition which defects is not able to continue by startirig some
kind of collusion among its members only because there is no scope for Joint pricing
other than to adopt the price which the other firms specify. Thus, no coalition of
defecting firms is able to agree upon continuing collusion among themselves. (Note
that this implication does not hold in general for quantity-based collusion because a
subcoalition might improve on the non-cooperative outcome by partial collusion.)
Second, suppose that an identical, small reduction from p* is taken by k firms. The
defection profits are











and shows that the defection profits are the higher the lower the number of defecting
oligopolists is:
(31) max{n? (k)|k < m} = FI? (1):= n? (p*)
Q.e.d.23
(31) redefines the defection profits as a function of the price p* for the defection of a
Single firm. (31) specifies the critical discount factors of (29) and (30) such that a
discount factor which makes defection of a Single firm unprofitable makes defection of
all other coalitions unprofitable as well. A salient result of the infinitely repeated
Bertrand game with constant unit cost is the assertion that any other equilibrium other
than the unique one-shot equilibrium may be sustained if the discount factor does not
fall short from l/m. The reason is that constant costs mean defection profits which are
m times the collusive profits, and.reverting to non-cooperation implies zero profits.













to l/m is unclear. Additionally, the critical discount factor is changed unambiguously
with changes of p* for both (29) and (30).
Proposition 9: The critical discount factors 8 and 6 increase with profits to be
sustained by implicit collusion.
Proof:
A necessary prerequisite for proving Proposition 9 is the relative behavior of the
















(32) demonstrates that the marginal defection profit is always greater than the marginal
collusion profit. (32) proves the first part of Proposition 9 directly because
differentiating (29) under the use of (31) gives
i- dn* C33) cio_
dp* n; >o






(34) is also positive because
holds, because due to the vanishing marginal collusive profit for pM, (34) is positive




which contradicts (32). Q.e.d. ,
This section has demonstrated that collusion is possible in both finitely and infinitely
repeated Bertrand games. It has also determined the relevant defection and the
behavior of the discount factor. The analysis was implicitly based on subgame-
perfection. The following section will deal with punishment strategies which substitute
for trigger strategies such that return to cooperation is possible which was mied out in
this section.
IV. Weakly renegotiation-proof Bertrand equilibria
The last section employed trigger strategies which do neither firm allow to return to
cooperation after deviance from p* has occurred once. These strategies ground their
credibility purely on subgame-perfection: as no firm can improve on charging another
price than p^ or p" if all other firms do as well, the punishment strategy defines an
equilibrium. This assertion may be found a too strong assumption, especially when
renegotiation is possible. Obviously, all firms regret that defection quits every future
cooperation. However, if defection did not change the continuation payoffs of
defecting firms, no cooperation were possible.
The concept of weak renegotiation-proofness reconciles the demands of punishing a
deviating firm and the Option to return to cooperation. An equilibrium is called weakly
renegotiation-proof if its continuation payoffs implied by the respective strategies are
not Pareto-dominated by other strategies. Typically, these strategies specify reverting
to non-cooperation for a certain period of those firms which have not defected. This
period is infinitely long if the firms which have defected do not play cooperatively
during punishment, i.e. are punished by "legal" defection of the other firms. If they do,
punishment will be finished after a certain punishment length, and the firms which had
punished return to cooperation. For infinitely repeated Bertrand games, return to
cooperation and punishment for defection is given by pursuing punishment strategy I.26
Punishment strategy I: Charge the price p* in the first period. If no firm has defected
(state 1); Charge the price p* also in the next period. Ifkfirms
,- -...., have defected by charging a lower price (state 2),Jcharge the
price pB in the next n^ periods. If a firm of those which have
defected does not Charge a price which exceeds p^ during the
•-••:•. n^ periods (state 3), restart charging p^ for the next n^
periods (state 2). If all firms which have defected have
charged a higher price than p^ during the njj periods (state 4),
charge price p* in period (n^+1) and return to State 1.
Such a punishment strategy is able to sustain an equilibrium which improves on the
non-cooperative Bertrand equilibrium if
• every firm is made refrain from defection in one period and no cooperation in all
future periods (profitability),
• every firm is made refrain from defection in one period and punishment during n^
periods compared to collusion in (n^+1) periods (ex ante compliance),
• every firm wants to return to cooperation after it has defected, i.e. wants to carry
the punishment costs for n^ periods and thereby wants to restart cooperation
compared to infinite punishment (ex post compliance), and
• every firm which has not defected improves on its profits by punishment compared
to non-cooperation.
The last condition will be discussed at the end of this section, but it should be clear
that - due to (15) - profits are higher than in the non-cooperative equilibrium if a
smaller number than m oligopolists charges the price p^. The first condition repeats
the condition for the trigger strategy, i.e. cooperation must be profitable compared to
defection and infinite non-cooperation, the second and the third condition will be
referred to as ex ante and ex post compliance, respectively.27
For general n^, ex ante and ex post compliance are materialized in (C3) and (C4),
respectively: : : ;/ —
n;>nf(k) n;nf(k) + 5n>^nr
1 -o 1—o l-o
The superscript p denotes the profits enjoyed by a firm during punishment. As these
firms are expected to set prices above those of firms which have not defected, their
punishment profits are zero. Note that n^ must belong tö the set of natural numbers
and is not given ex ante but determined by the punishment strategies. (C3) and (C4)
are fulfilled for every nk elN if p* is set equal to p^ because this trivial non-
improving equilibrium equalizes collusive and defection profits. Compared to the
trigger strategy I, weak renegotiation-proofness adds another two conditions which
dominate (C2).
Proposition 10: The conditions of ex ante and ex post compliance dominate the
profitability constraint,
Suppose than an n^ exists which fulfils (C3) and (C4) and which improves on the non-
cooperative Bertrand equilibrium. (C2) implies
n;>(i-5)nf(k)+8nl
B,






respectively, which inserted into the reformulation of (C2) demonstrate that (C2) is
always fulfilled. Q.e.d.28
Comparing (C3) and (C4) demonstrates that n^ has different impacts on ex ante and ex
post compliance. If the punishment length is increased (decreased), ex ante compliance
is strengthened (weakened) because the periods of zero profits are given more (less)
weight. On the contrary, ex post compliance is weakened (strengthened) because the
costs of reinvesting into cooperation after defection are increased (decreased). (C3)
and (C4) must be met for any relevant üf (k). As Proposition 8 still applies, one may
concentrate on the defection profits of a Single firm which enter only (C3) and not
(C4) because these profits are sunk after defection. (C4) implies a critical proiit
FIi (nk) from which FI* must not fall short in order to ensure ex post compliance:
(35) n,(nk ):=!£, nt(nk=0) = nJ
dfii , anf A d% n sl2nf _ —







Oi (nk) is defined as a function of n^ and has an increasing, convex shape. According
to (C3), the defection profits must not exceed fl^n^; in order to ensure ex ante
compliance, ft^r^) is also defined as a function of n^ and has an increasing, convex
shape as well.







 j dn^ 5"
k (1 - 5) '
Comparing (35) and (36) reveals that both functions coincide for n^ = 0 and that due
to 1/(1-5) > 1
dnk dnk
holds, i.e. the rij-curve is always steeper than the nrcurve.29
The defection profits as a function of the critical profit leyel fl; exhibit also an
increasing, convex shape because Flf does not depend directly on n^ but only
indirectly via Yli such that
dft, dnl
holds.
Because all functions are increasing and convex and all Start at Flf for n^ = 0, there is
maximally only one intersection of two functions possible. Two intersections implied
concavity of at least one function. Furthermore, it is known from (32) that
dllf/dll* > 1 such that the shape of the F^-function must lie strictly leftwards from
the shape of the 1%-function. Intersection of the Flf-function is therefore only possible
with the FI;-function. The attainable punishment specifications of n^ are determined
by the subset of natural numbers in the ränge for which the n^-function does not lie
above the TIj -function. Three cases can be distinguished which are given in the
following figures.
Figurel: Tl* = nf
rf30
Figufe 1 depicts the case in which improvement on the non-cooperative equilibrium is
not possible. The ränge for which Ilf falls Short from flj is too small such that no
nk SIN exists which could guarantee both ex ante and ex post compliance. Such an n^
exists for the case depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 2;
In Figure 2, n^ e {1,2,3} is able to sustain a profit level beyond the non-cooperative
one. The best available profit can be read from the intersection of n^ = 3 with the
critical profit level fir Figure 2 depicts the case of a profit-improving equilibrium
which falls short from perfect collusion. Perfect collusion is sustained in the case




In Figure 3, nf does not intersect tli in the relevant ränge such that perfect collusion
can be sustained by specifying nk eIN .
Collecting the arguments, it is obvious that the best available outcome is reäched when
njf is maximized subject to the constraints imposed by (C3) and (C4). Thus, the chosen
number of punishment periods which maximizes collusive profits is determined by
(37) 3nk£lN: n* = max{nk eIN In? (f^ ^fi^n, )A fli(nk)< nf
,}.
(37) and the shapes of all curves imply Proposition 11.
Proposition 11: If a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium exists which improves on
the Pareto-dominant one-shot equilibrium, such a weakly
renegotiation-proof equilibrium does also existfor a unity punishment
length.
Proof: Omitted.32
The specification of n^ makes a difference for finitely repeated Bertrand games.
Punishment strategy II is a stationary strategy which may improve on the non-
cooperative equilibrium.
Punishment strategy II: Charge the price p* in the first period. If no firm has defected
(state 1), charge the price p* also in the next period if the next
period is not the last period. If k firms have defected by
charging a lower price (state 2), charge the price p" in the next
period. If a firm of those which have defected does not charge
a price which exceeds p" during the punishment period (state
3), restart charging p" for the next period (state 2). If all firms
which have defected have charged a higher price than p"
during the punishment period (state 4), charge price p* in the
following period and return to State one if this period is not
the last one, and charge p' if the following period is the last
one.
This strategy has specified a of punishment period of one. Without further
justification, this specification were an arbitrary assumption which may restrict the
scope for collusion more than necessary. However, this specification will be shown to
be implied by finitely repeated Bertrand games if strategies are stationary. Stationary
means that n^ is not made dependent on the period of defection.
Table 1 demonstrates the impact of different n^ on the profus of a firm after defection.Table 1:
33


























Table 1 shows that a firm which has defected would realize no profits if nk = 5 and if
it accepts punishment. Obviously, nk = 5 cannot guarantee ex post compliance
whereas nk = 4 and nk = 3 allow to realize profits. But when t = 1 or t = 2 are reached,
respectively, nk = 4 and nk = 3 can also not guarantee ex post compliance. This
evaluation is the intuition for Proposition 12.
Proposition 12: A stationary punishment scheme for finitely repeated Bertrand games
implies a punishment period of unity length. If T\[ <[(1 + 5)/5]n",
no weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium exists which improves on
the non-cooperative equilibrium.
Proof:
The proof will be developed by discussing ex post compliance in finitely repeated
Bertrand games. Ex post compliance is guaranteed if (C5) is met:
(C5) VT<T-1:
if nk < T - X,
1 — 5 n if nk=T-T,34
(c) o>^ " n- if nk>T-T.
l-o
If the punishment period falls short from the remaining periods, i.e. nk < T — X, the
discounted sum of collusive profits plus FI[ must exceed the discounted sum of
realizing FI,". If punishment Covers the whole ränge of collusive profits, i.e.
nkj = T —T, the discounted value of realizing FI[ in the last period must exceed the
discounted sum of realizing IT," in all remaining periods. If nk > T — T, punishment
gave the defector no profits.




(C5)' develops a restriction which must hold as a necessary condition for any weakly
renegotiation-proof equilibrium which improves on the non-cooperative profits. As
(C5a) is dominated by (C5b), the Pareto-dominant profits must not fall short from
(l+§)/8 times the profits of marginal cost pricing. Since (l+5)/5 exceeds 2 for ö < 1,
any profit-improving weakly renegotiation-proof equilibria in finitely repeated
Bertrand games is not possible if FI[ falls short from double Fl". This result holds for
all strategies because it addresses only defection in the next-to-last period. Note that
(C5)' depends on neither the collusive nor the defection profit level.
(C6) gives the condition for ex ante compliance for all periods which do not Cover the
last one.
(C6) (i35
Compliance in the last two periods is ex ante given if the profus of realizing II* and
O' do not fall short from realizing Flf and FI". This condition coincides with (Cl)'.
Since neither (Cl)' nor (C6) dominate the other restriction on purely theoretic grounds,
p* is determined according to (38) for finitely repeated Bertrand games which employ
punishment strategy II:
08) p'=p




(38) determines the collusive price for stationary punishment strategies. However,
dynamic schemes may exist which Pareto-dominate stationary schemes.
Proposition 13: A dynamic punishment scheme Pareto-dominates the corresponding
stationary punishment scheme if a X, x< T-l, exists for which (C5b)
isfulfilled.
Proof: see appendix.
If another x exists which meets (C5b), a punishment scheme is able to specify longer
punishment periods for potential defection. For example, if (C5b) is also fulfilled by
x = T-2, ex post compliance is also guaranteed if defection from the collusive price in
T-3 is punished by a two-period punishment. The appendix proves that this two-period
punishment pronounces ex ante compliance and allows to realize collusive profus in
T-3 which surmount FI* implied by the stationary punishment scheme.
All firms which have not defected from p* are expected to punish by charging p
B or
p", respectively. Punishment is credible because the respective profits which punishing
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according to the respective punishment strategies surmount the non-cooperative profus
since profits increase with a decreasing number of oligopolists for a given price (see
(15)). pB(m) and p"(m) denote the non-cooperative prices for m oligopolists. (39a) and
(39b) show that punishment is in that sense credible and will be carried through.
V. Punishment-proof and strongly renegotiation-proof Bertrand equilibria
Weak renegotiation-proofness bases its credibility on two assumptions: first, every
firm which has defected is not able to submit a proposal which substitutes for
punishment and restarting cooperation. In this sense, firms which punish are assumed
to eommit itself credibly to punish and to reject any weakly renegotiation-proof
alternative even if it Pareto-dominates punishment and restarting cooperation. That
equilibria improving on non-cooperative outcomes should be also immune against
alternative weakly renegotiation-proof proposals was introduced by the refinement of
strong renegotiation-proofness (Farrell, Maskin, 1989). An equilibrium is called
strongly renegotiation-proof if it is weakly renegotiation-proof, and no weakly
renegotiation-proof equilibrium exists which Pareto-dominates punishment and
restarting cooperation according to the strategy specification of the original
equilibrium.
Before turning to strong renegotiation-proofness, another demand will be introduced
which is called punishment-proofness. The motivation for punishment-proofness is
due to the possibility that a subcoalition of all oligopolists and not only Single firms
may defect from implicit collusion. Weak renegotiation-proofness assumed that all
firms act the same in that they all either accept or reject punishment. A Single firm,37
however, may have an incentive to defect unilaterally from being punished whereas it
hopes that other firms accept punishment. An equilibrium is called punishment-proof if
the condition for ex ante and ex post compliance hold and ifno defector is better offby
unilaterally deviating from being punished after defection.
In a duopolistic setting, punishment-proofness raised no problem because all firms act
the same since the maximum number of defecting firms is one. If several firms have
defected, however, they may enter a prisoners' dilemma Situation. According to the
punishment strategies, every defection from being punished of a Single firm is
responded to by a new Start of punishment. Thus, only if every firm accepts to be
punished, cooperation is restarted. But a Single firm may increase its profus by
charging the same price which is charged by the punishing fixrns. If it is the only firm
pursuing this strategy, the corresponding costs are the delay of a restart of cooperation.
Therefore, every single firm has an incentive to deviate from being punished if a





(40a) and (40b) give the respective conditions for an incentive of a single firm to
defect from being punished in infinitely and finitely repeated Bertrand games,
respectively. Note that (40a) and (40b) cannot hold for k= 1 because defection from
being punished of single firm is ruled out by ex post compliance. If (40a) is valid, a
single firm is better off if it charges the price p^ and delays return to cooperation by
n^ periods, given that all other firms accept punishment. Due to the prisoners' dilemma
among firms to be punished, (40a) does not give the realized profits but the incentive
to deviate from punishment if all other firms do not. (40b) gives the incentive for
finitely repeated Bertrand games employing a stationary punishment scheme. The
incentive to deviate from one-period punishment is given if defection profits surmount38
the delay of a restarting cooperation which is determined either by the coUusive profits
or the difference between realizing Pareto-dominant profits and marginal cost pricing
profits. If min{n*,[n[ — FI"]} = 11*, punishment-proofness is at least not given for
all periods except the last one, if min{n*,[n[ - Fl"]} = 11' -IT", punishment-
proofness is at least not given for the last period T. If
Xm - k +1] > ömax{n* ,[FI' -Fl"]} holds, punishment-proofness is given
for neither period. Of course, anticipation of defection from punishment destroys ex
ante compliance as well.
However, weak renegotiation-proofness and punishment-proofness may be reconciled
by alternative pricing rules:
(41a)
(4ib)
Proposition 14: A weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium exists which is punishment-
proofas well if the price determination according to (41a) and (41b),
respectively Julfüs p' < p(k) < p" and p' < p(k) < p", respectively.
Proof:
If both prices belong to the ranges indicated by Proposition 14, both prices qualify for
prices of a non-cooperative equilibrium. Then, defection from being punished can be
avoided by this pricing rule which specifies the price charged by the firms which have
not defected as a function of the number of firms which have defected. The
punishment strategies are modified:
Punishmentstrategy///.Pursue punishment strategy I except for p^ which is
substituted for by p(k) as the price to be charged when k
firms have defected.39
Punishment strategy IV:Pursue punishment strategy I except for p" which is
substituted for by p(k) as the price to be charged when k
firms have defected.
(41a) and (41b) make every Single firm indifferent between defecting unilaterally from
punishment and accepting punishment. (4la) and (41b) restore weak renegotiation-
proofness because both ex ante and ex post compliance are not endangered when there
is no incentive to defect unilaterally from being punished, and (41a) and (41b) can be
interpreted as generalizing ex ante and post compliance. If p(k) and p(k),
respectively, belong to the set of non-cooperative equilibrium prices, weak
renegotiation-proofness is made immune against unilateral deviations. Q.e.d.
Strong renegotiation-proofness is guaranteed if no alternative can improve on
punishment and restarting cooperation. Because the set of Pareto-dominant, weakly
renegotiation-proof equilibria is a singleton such that only one best, attainable
equilibrium exists, firms whieh have defected will propose to restart the original
agreement at once instead of punishment and restarting cooperation later on. This
alternative quits punishment and does not change profits after punishment should have
ended because it specifies the same outcome from this point on. Obviously, firms
which have defected will always improve on their profits. If the other firms do as well
and they cannot credibly commit themselves to reject this proposal, they can be
expected to accept this proposal. Accepting the original agreement instead of
punishment, however, had the fatal implication that any punishment strategy were
incredible because all firms anticipate that they will never be punished, and any
collusion could not be sustained unless firms can credibly commit themselves to reject
any proposal which substitutes for punishment. If this commitment is ruled out, strong
renegotiation-proofness is given if the profits enjoyed by punishing are higher than
those of collusion.
Proposition 15: A strongly renegotiation-proof equilibrium exists for a sufficiently
high discountfactor:40
Proof:




hold, respectively. (42a) and (42b) take into account that no firm will defect from
being punished if p(k) and p(k), respectively, are charged by other firms during




Because profits decrease with the number of oligopolists for a given price, the RHS
falls short from unity. Hence, a set of discount factors exists all of which surmount the
critical discount factor 8 and thereby guarantee strong renegotiation-proofness.
From (41b), it is known that ni[p(k),m-k + l]>8n* must hold. In combination
with (42b), strong renegotiation-proofness is assured if
e n.fp(k),m-k (43b) 8>
 lLV
holds. In (43b), the numerator falls short from the denominator, too. Thus, a set of
discount factors exists all of which surmount the critical discount factor 8 and thereby
guarantee strong renegotiation-proofness.
Q.e.d.41
VI. Extensions: Stackeiberg modeis and endogenous market structures
The last sections have adopted the Standard assumptions of Bertrand competition. This
section will discuss two lines of extensions, the impact of Stackeiberg leaders and
open markets, which both provide new results for Bertrand competition under
increasing marginal costs. It will concentrate on non-cooperative equilibria because
assuming a certain mover structure as well as endogenous market structures
complicate the discussion of implicit collusion such substantially that they deserved an
own paper (for a paper on collusion in open markets, see Friedman, Thisse, 1994).
Throughout this section, all prices will be dealt with as functions of the number of
oligopolists operating in the market. This assignment allows to deal explicitjy with the
impact of moves either for a given number of firm or for a number of potential rivals.
Obviously, Stackeiberg leaders cannot play such a dominant role in Bertrand
competition as in Cournot competition because prices they announce may either be
adopted or even cut by other competitors. For a given market structure, the first-mover
advantage cannot provide a Stackeiberg leader with higher profits compared to other
firms, but the Stackeiberg leader is able to fix the price such that the maximum
attainable profits in a non-cooperative setting are guaranteed.
Proposition 16: If a certain firm out of the m firms has a first-mover advantage such
that it can credibly commit on announcing a certain price without any




The proof can be given in the traditional backward induction fashion. Suppose first
that all firms have a certain position such that the Stackeiberg leader announces his
price firstly, a second firm announces its price secondly, etc., until the last firm
announces its price. Proposition 16 holds if every firm following the other firm has no
incentive to Charge a lower price, thereby capturing the whole market demand. The42
last firm to announce a price has obviously no incentive to Charge a lower price if the
price announced by the next-to-last firm lies in the ränge between p'(m) and p"(m).
Thus, the price specified by the Stackeiberg leader would not be attacked by the last
firm if all other firms have taken this price as well. The next-to-last firm knows that
the last firm will not Charge a lower price if all m-1 firms have charged a price in this
ränge. If all m-2 firms have taken this price, the next-to-last firm will also not deviate
frpm this price: due to (17) and (19), both p
, and pM are increased with a decreasing
number of oligopolists. As they know that all following firms will either take the same
price or cut the price, they know that they will be never alone with this price so that
any restriction implied by p" will be only temporary. Thus, the incentive to take the
price announced by preceding firms is strengthened the lower the number of preceding
firms is. Therefore, all firms will take the price which all preceding firms have
announced if it falls into the ränge between p' or pM, respectively, and p". This result
does also hold if some firms have to move simultaneously because increasing the
number of firms to move simultaneously in a stage has the same impact as decreasing
m in (17) and (19). As a result, the Stackeiberg leader may Charge all prices in this
ränge, and will choose the price which maximizes his (and consequently also all other
firms') profus. Q.e.d.
The introduction of fixed costs does not change the results for the closed market unless
fixed costs are assumed to overcompensate the profits based on marginal cost pricing.
If they do, however, fixed costs can be expected to make any firm refrain from




which should be added to (11). Therefore, the assumption of no fixed costs has biased
the investigation of section II in favor of the Bertrand paradox. If fixed costs are zero,
(1 1)' is redundant because marginal costs always exceed average costs in this case. If
fixed costs are non-zero and marginal costs are constant, there is no price which gives
strictly positive demand and fulfils (11) and (11)' if more than one firm is in the43
market. In any case, fixed costs do not change the essentials of seetion II but
strengthen the arguments given there.
Fixed costs are, however, a constructive assumption if market structures are
endogenous and determined by the non-profit condition. If
(4)' n.-p.Xi-Cfx,), Cx>0, ^>0,
Cx(0)<X-'[X=0], Cx[X(0)]<oo, C(0j = FC>0,
is substituted for (4), one may determine the market structure in an open market. If
entry decisions are a game under perfect knowledge, all firms can make their decision
dependent on other firms' entries into the market. In this case, constant unit costs and
fixed costs implied a monopoly because any industry structure involving more than
one firm induced losses for every firm. This conclusion does not hold for strictly
convex cost functions.
Proposition 17: If market entry is allowed and all firms observe their rivals' entry
decisions, multiple equilibria may exist.
Proof:
(44) uses the non-profit condition to determine the equilibnum number m* of firms
entering the Bertrand market:
(44) ni[p
B(2)]<0: m*=0 if n,
M<0,





If fixed costs are very high, the market will either not be served or monopolized. If the
market carries more than one firm, the equilibnum number of firms entering the
market depends on the price which is charged by all m* firms. As multiple equilibria
exist for a given firm structure, the equilibrium firm structure is not necessarily44
unique. Consider the following example which gives the profit Structure for monopoly,
for marginal cost pricing and for the Pareto-dominant price:
n?*=io, . n,[p'(2)]=5, • n;[
Obviously, no firm will either leave or enter the market in at least two cases: first, if
two firms are in the market which Charge the respective marginal cost price, second, if
three firms are in the market which charge the respective Pareto-dominant price. Q.e.d.
If a certain mover structure is given only for market entry, the results are not changed.
However, the firms arrive at a different result if a Stackelberg leader exists which does
not only move first with respect to entry, but with respect to price announcement as
well. (45) gives the unique equilibrium price.
(45) p
Bt:=
^ )|n, [p V* +1)] < 0, pim*) < p
B (m*) < min{p V )»P
M }}
Proposition 18: // market entry is allowed, if all firms observe their rivals' entry
decisions, and if a certain firm out of the m firms has a first-mover
advantage such that it can credibly commit on entry or non-entry and
on announcing a certain price without any Option for revision, the
equilibrium price is given by p
B*.
Proof: Omitted.
The arguments are quite similar to the case of a fixed market structure. The only
difference is the fact that no natural last mover exists. However, the Stackelberg leader
can specify a price such that the profits of all firms in the market are maximized but no
further firm wants to enter because further entry incurred losses for all firms.
Therefore, the Stackelberg leader specifies a price which lies a* the margin between
entry and non-entry of a further firm, such that a small price increase implied entry of45
a further firm. This strategy gives all firms which enter maxi mum profus which are
basically due to the integer constraint on the industry structure. :
If market entry is a game under almost perfect knowledge (as the price game), all
firms have to decide simultaneously whether to entry or not to entry without being
able to observe the decisions of their potential rivals. Proposition 19 extends the well-
known result for asymmetric equilibria.
Proposition 19: // market entry is allowed and all potential firms have to enter
simultaneously without being able to observe their rivals' entry
decisions, multiple equilibria for asymmetric pure strategies in a one-
shot Bertrand game may exist such that the number of firms entering
the market is undetermined.
Proof: See Proofof Proposition 17.
Proposition 17 has demonstrated that the number of firms which are carried by the
market varies with the price charged by firms. Therefore, Proposition 19 is
straightforward.
It is also well-known that in addition to the asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies a
Symmetrie mixed strategy equilibrium exists. The idea is that firms do not decide on
entry or non-entry by certainty but enter the market by probability q. For evaluating
the equilibrium q, they have to assess the price which they expect if a certain number
of firms have entered. For every potential industry structure, the expected price is
assumed to be evaluated by means of a probability funetion with density funetion fm:
p
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m denotes the number of potential rivals which are able to enter the market. Firms are
assumed to be risk-neutral such that they evaluate their entry decisions on the basis of
the expected prices p(m) according to (46). (47) ensures that the market does not
carry all potential rivals so that a certain entry, i.e. q = 1, is no equilibrium strategy:
(47) 3nr<m: ni[p(m"),SC]>0, n.[p(m** + l),SC]<0
(47) assumes some strictly positive sunk costs SC which are implied by market entry
and which pronounce the problem associated with the simultaneous move structure of
the entry game. m** is the critical number of firms for which profits become negative
by market entry of an additional firm. In Standard industrial organization modeis, the
determination of the equilibrium q is unique because the outcome for a every possible
industry structure is assumed to be unique. Due to the evaluation along (46), this
uniqueness is not guaranteed.
Proposition 20: // market entry is allowed and all potential firms have to enter
simultaneously without being able to observe their rivals' entry
decisions, multiple equilibria for Symmetrie mixed strategies in a one-
shot Bertrand game may exist.
Proof:
All firms maximize their expected profits by choosing the corresponding entry
probability q. In a Symmetrie mixed strategy equilibrium, no firm is able to improve
on its expected profits by specifying a different probability, given the (identical)
probabilities of all other firms. This condition is met if the expected profits are zero,
because positive (negative) profits implied improvement for a firm by increasing
(decreasing) its entry probability. The equilibrium probability q* is determined in (48).
(48) q': q-l
j=047
(48) mirrors the ;expected profus: the probability of one firm's own entry must be
multiplied with the expected profits of the industry struktures which are made possible
by different behavior of all other firms. The probability of non-entry can be neglected
because non-entry implies zero profits. As an example, suppose that three potential
rivals may enter the market, and the profit structure is
ni[p
M]-sc = 2.25, ni[p'(2)]-sc = 2, n^p'^J-sc^-a,
ni[p'(3)]-SC = 1.75, ni[p
//(3)]-SC = -4.
Assume further that every firm expects marginal cost pricing if two firms enter and
Pareto-dominant pricing if three firms enter. This probability specification gives the
quadratic equation
q
2-q +2.25 = 0
which has two relevant Solutions:
q; =0.3419, q; =0.6581.
Q.e.d.
Thus, unless the probability functions are further specified, a unique equilibnum is not
guaranteed. Such a specification must go beyond assuming a specific functional form,
because the change of the spread between p" and p' or p^, respectively, is unknown on
purely theoretical grounds. Such a specification could adopt some focal point
assumptions such that firms will always Charge the Pareto-dominant price.
If the game is repeated, all firms will reconsider to enter the market after every stage if
they have not entered in the past. A firm which has entered will not exit because entry
costs were sunk. The probability q(t) to enter in period t in a multi-stage game is







(49) specifies the expected number of firms, m(t), which depends on the equilibrium
strategy. For past and experienced periods, the realized number of firms is taken, of
course. Every firm solves an intertemporal maximization problem the dynamic
equilibrium of which is defined by (50):
(50)-VT>0, Vt>x:




s.t. (49) VT: T < T < °°.
The probability of entry is set zero for all remaining periods if the critical number of
firms is at least reached. If this number is not reached, the equilibrium path of entry
probabilities equalizes the discounted profits with zero, taking into account the impact
on expected future industry structure. As this path is evaluated on stochastic grounds, a
revaluation is undertaken in every period on the basis of the realized market structure.
Because this dynamic version is obviously not able to remove the feature of multiple
equilibria, different paths may exist which constitute a dynamic equilibrium.
VII. Concluding remarks
This paper has demonstrated that the Bertrand paradox does not hold if cost functions
are strictly convex. Instead, multiple equilibria were shown to exist which can be
Pareto-ranked. The paper has also shown that the Pareto-dominant equilibrium may49
imply profus higher than in Cournot competition or may even sustain perfect
cartelization. Turning to repetition of the Bertrand game, the paper has demonstrated
that other than non-cooperative equilibria may be sustained by finite and by infinite
repetition.
The novelty of this paper's results concerns two main conclusions: first, other than
marginal cost pricing equilibria are possible in pure Bertrand oligopolies without
taking recourse to rationing, second, multiple equilibria exist in the one-shot game and
in several entry games except when a Stackeiberg leader is assumed. The first
conclusion narrows the gap between Cournot- and Bertrand-based oligopoly modeis
without additional assumptions. It is the impression of the author that Bertrand-based
oligopoly modeis have either too often relied on the assumption of constant unit costs
or have employed other mechanisms like capacity constraints and rationing without
assuming corresponding mechanisms in the respective Cournot game. The assumption
of constant unit costs has been shown not to be an innocent one but the one which
drives prices down on marginal costs.
The second conclusion strengthens the difference between Bertrand and Cournot
oligopoly modeis for which the existence and uniqueness of a non-cooperative
equilibrium is guaranteed by the assumptions of this paper. Unless constant unit costs
are assumed, the crucial difference between both modeis turns out as the equilibrium
selection problem encountered by Bertrand competition. The multiplicity of equilibria
in the one-shot game, however, does also allow to sustain collusion in a finitely
repeated Bertrand game.
This paper has not explored the impacts of relaxing the homogeneity assumption.
However, it should be obvious that the results for perfect substitutability are likely to
hold for nearly perfect substitutability as well. It is hence also not clear whether firms
are always better off when pronouncing the heterogeneity of their goods compared to
their competitors. Instead, it may be found attractive for firms not to stress
heterogeneity because a high degree of homogeneity gives shelter against price50
reductions of other firms as it caused significant demand increases and consequently
overproportional cost increases for price-reducing firms if marginal costs increase.
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Appendix
From Proposition 13, one can conclude that (C5b) is fulfüled for x = T-2 if it is
fulfüled in general for a T < Tl. Consider the following amendment to punishment
strategy II:
Amendment to punishment strategy II: Punishment strategy II holds for all periods
except defection in period T-3. If a firm deviates in period T-3, it will be punished for
two periods. Firms which have not defected Charge price p". If all firms which have
defected Charge a higher price, all firms Charge p' in the last period, if a firm which has
defected does not Charge a higher price during punishment, punishment is restarted
such that p" is charged in all remaining periods.
This amendment does not claim to guarantee the best available outcome but will be
shown to be able to improve on the stationary punishment scheme. It implies the
dynamic scheme [nk(t),n**(t)]o such that52
(AI) Vt*T-2: nk(t) = l, nk(T-2) = 2
holds. nk(t) denotes the number of punishment periods starting in period t after
defection in t-1 has occurred, and n**(t) denotes the collusive profits of the dynamic
plan. The proof is given if n**(t)>n* holds for all t. Additionally, assuming
FI* < Tlf ensures a potential for improvement. If (C5b) is fulfilled, i.e.
(A2) 5
2n;>(i+5)n;'
holds, ex ante compliance determines the critical profit reachable by two-period
punishment:




(A3) gives the possible profits for period T-3 which should not fall short from the one
of the purely stationary punishment strategy to prove Pareto-dominance. nf denotes
defection from the collusive profit level of period T-3. Note that (Cl)' plays no role for
(A3) as it concerns the last two periods. Define
(A4) n^p*+*,):= nrcr-3), n
d(P* + ?,):=n
dd(T-3),
which indicate the change of profits and prices in period T-3 compared to all other
periods which apply the stationary punishment scheme. X = 0 indicates the stationary
price and the stationary profit sustained by finite repetition. (C6) gives for the LHS of
(A3)




A fortiori, (A3) is met if the RHS of (A5) surmounts the RHS of (A3):
n" (T - 3) > n?
d (T-3) - sn; - 8
2n?53
There is scope for Pareto improvement if (A6) is fulfilled for a strictly positive X,.
Comparing (A6) and (C6) for X = 0, (A7) shows that there is indeed scope for a strictly
positive X because (A6) is overfulfiUed for a zero X:
n
d
(A7) V6>o: n;>—i->(i () ()
1 + 5
Q.e.d.